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ABSTRACT: No weakening, but rather an expansion, of statehood can be observed in the contemporary 
world. This does not, on the other hand, imply that extensive forms of constitutional ordering do not 
exist outside the realm of states. Instead, the evolution of world society has been characterized by 
a protracted dual movement where the expansion and densification of statehood and autonomous 
forms of transnational ordering gradually emerged in a mutually constitutive fashion. One implication 
of this is that neither the concept of the state nor the concept of nonstate transnational entities 
is adequately capable of delineating the object of constitutional analysis. Instead, the concept of 
normative orders has been introduced as an overarching category capable of identifying the contexts 
within which constitutional ordering emerges.
Subsequently, a distinction between the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative 
orders has been introduced, specifying them as respectively oriented towards establishing internal 
condensation of a given normative order and external compatibility between different normative 
orders. With this background, a framework for the analysis of constitutional frameworks of normative 
orders developed. The central element is a distinction among three dimensions: First, a constitution 
implies a coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical organization of a 
given normative order capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a concordant 
legal framework. Second, constitutionalization implies a coupling between an internal reconstruction 
of an external constitutional subject within the constitutional object, and the register of legal rights, 
establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object and the wider world as 
represented by the constitutional subject. Third, constitutionalism denotes the institutionalization of a 
double function, in the form of a principle‑based and legally fortified striving toward universal inclusion, 
providing a sense of direction in time through an articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The insights developed are briefly illustrated by the case of the global Fairtrade Certification System.
SUMMARY: Introduction; I – The expansion of limited statehood; II – The multiple layers of world 
society; III – The internal and external law of normative orders: condensation and transfer; IV – The 
reconfiguration of cognitive and normative structures of expectations; V – The double reflexivity of 
internal constitutions; VI – The double prestation of external constitutionalization; VII – The double 
function of constitutionalism between past and future; VIII – The example of the fairtrade certification 
system.
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INTRODuCTION
The central function of nation-state law is to uphold normative 
expectations1. In contrast, transnational law is primarily oriented toward 
establishing frameworks of transfer and mutual adaptation2. This function is, 
however, not only unfolded within interstate frameworks. Instead of transnational 
law, a broader category of law, which deals with transfers and adaptations 
between normative orders as such, has emerged. This type of law can also be 
understood as a specific form of transnormative law insofar as it is characterized 
by a relative structural supremacy of cognitive rather than normative structures 
of expectations due to its primary orientation toward the establishment of 
increased mutual adaptability among normative orders.
Existing perspectives tend to understand the relationship between the 
cognitive and normative dimensions of law on the basis of a zero-sum perspective, 
where more of one implies less of the other. The distinction between the cognitive 
and normative dimensions of law is, however, logically conditioned by the 
continued relevance of both dimensions. From a sociological perspective, the 
relation between the cognitive and normative dimensions of law are moreover 
characterized by a relationship of mutual increase where more of one implies 
more of the other. Instead of experiencing marginalization, normative-based legal 
communication has undergone a reconfiguration, which increasingly transforms 
the normative dimension into a strategic rather than tactical component. This, 
again, is the central reason for the emergence of constitutional semantics beyond 
the state in recent decades, insofar as constitutional structures are the framework 
through which a second-order normative stabilization of primarily cognitive-
oriented legal processes is achieved.
This development has advanced the most in relation to social processes 
characterized by a primacy of functional differentiation and a reduced 
reliance on stratificatory and territorial forms of differentiation as internal 
forms of stabilization. In such settings, three-dimensional frameworks have 
emerged that rely on the concepts of constitutions, constitutionalization, 
and constitutionalism; and which serve as legal forms of the self-reflection, 
prestation (Leistung), and function-producing dimensions of social processes. 
Constitutions are here understood as internal forms of ordering which are 
oriented toward the establishment of a hierarchy of norms; constitutionalization 
as the process through which exchanges and transfers between social entities 
1 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM] 124 (Suhrkamp Verlag 
1993) (Ger.) (discussing law as a social system).
2 See generally Marc Amstutz & Vaios Karavas, Weltrecht: Ein Derridasches Monster [Global Law: Derridasches 
Monster], in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GÜNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 75. 
GEBURTSTAG 645 [SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE. COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR GÜNTHER 
TEUBNER’S 75TH BIRTHDAY] (Gralf-Peter Callies et al. eds. 2009) (Ger.) (developing a specific t heory of 
world law).
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and their environments are legally stabilized; and constitutionalism as a specific 
legal form through which the unity of past and future are established. The 
transnational framework for fair-trade labeling illustrates these insights.
I – ThE EXPANSION Of LIMITED STATEhOOD
Most perspectives on constitutionalism in the global realm explicitly 
or implicitly depart from the assumption that a weakening of statehood can 
be observed and that this development is one of the primary courses for the 
emergence of constitutionalism beyond the state3. This perspective, in several 
ways, reflects a crude and simplified understanding of statehood. From a purely 
numerical perspective, the number of states has continued to expand rapidly 
throughout the last two centuries, particularly throughout the last fifty years. 
Furthermore, in terms of its reach, the phenomenon of statehood has gained 
a global status only very recently, namely in the wake of the decolonization 
processes of the mid-twentieth century4. Thus, when observed from a long-term 
historical perspective, an unprecedented quantitative expansion in statehood 
has taken place in recent history. But also, statehood has continued expanding 
qualitatively. If one characterizes a “strong state” as based on a formal and 
operational distinction between the state and other segments of society, a fairly 
stable institutional setup, and an extensive though not necessarily exclusive 
capability to deploy political power in a generalized manner throughout its 
territory, then it is possible to argue that a larger part of the planet is characterized 
by strong statehood today than in any previous historical period5.
But the expansion of statehood does not imply that the state-centrist 
society, which scholars – such as Dieter Grimm6 and Martin Loughlin7 – refer 
to, is alive and well. A sober historical sociological perspective reveals that 
the state-centric society – where all social operations within a given territory 
are succumbed to the supremacy of the state while at the same time this state-
based society remains clearly demarcated from other societies – has in fact 
3 See generally JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (discussing and debating t he specialization and fragmentation that occurs in 
international law).
4 Rudolf Stichweh, Dimensionen des Weltstaats im System der Weltpolitik [Dimensions of the World State 
within the System of World Politics], in WELTSTAAT UND WELTSTAATLICHKEIT: BEOBACHTUNGEN 
GLOBALER POLITISCHER STRUKTURBILDUNG [WORLD STATE AND WORLD STATEHOOD: OBSERVATIONS 
OF GLOBAL POLITICAL STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT] 25 (Mathias Albert & Rudolf Stichweh eds. 2007) 
(Ger.) (arguing that every political communication is embedded in a system of world politics and discussing 
the question of whether this system constitutes a world state).
5 See Poul F. Kjaer, The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational Constitutionalism: A Sociological 
Perspective, in AFTER GLOBALIZATION – NEW PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL AND 
LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION 285 (Christian Jorges & Tommi Ralli eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1870003 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
6 See Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World, in THE 
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3, 3-4 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
7 See Von Martin Loughlin, In Defence of Staatslehre, 48 DER STAAT 1, 1 (2009).
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never existed. The state, understood as a distinct political entity, has always 
been faced with competition from extensive forms of ordering outside the state. 
For example, as Chris Thornhill argued, the German state was unable to deploy 
its power throughout its territory in an unquestioned manner until sometime 
in the mid-twentieth century, after the nobility-based forms of private ordering 
finally collapsed in the wake of National Socialism and the Second World War8. 
In a similar manner, it might be argued, the U.S. federal government did not gain 
unquestioned authority in the southern United States before sometime in the 
mid-twentieth century, because until this point federal power was continuously 
challenged by localistic counter movements. Furthermore, in places such as 
southern Italy, southeastern Turkey, and the Basque Country, similar counter 
movements continue to be vibrant today, just as the strong presence of localistic 
power structures remains the norm in most parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America thereby creating a basis for legal pluralism9. Thus, the vast majority 
of the world has not yet been subject to a successful Hegelian codification of 
society in its entirety by the state. Instead, the state acts only as a thin veneer 
covering up very persistent private and local forms of social ordering, which 
operate beneath the state.
However, what is more important than this legal pluralist insight is that 
modern statehood has always been linked to the reproduction of a limited num-
ber of quite specific social functions. So even though a larger part of the globe is 
gradually characterized by a modern type of statehood, in which a limited, but 
generalized form of political power is deployed throughout a territorial terrain, 
this does not mean that all social operations within the territory in question auto-
matically succumbed to political power. Political power remains fundamentally 
incapable of defining or controlling, for example, religious beliefs, the beauty 
of art, the value of news, or scientific truths. Political supremacy exists only in 
relation to the specific, albeit very fundamental, social functions of political 
power, such as the legitimate exercise of physical violence10. One consequence 
of this is, as Gunther Teubner observed, that even the totalitarian regimes of the 
twentieth century did not manage to eradicate the existence of independent 
sources of social meaning (Sinn) within realms, such as art, science, religion, 
and economy, but the regimes merely suppressed these spheres of society and 
forced them into an underground existence11. Another consequence of the struc-
tural limitation inherent to modern political power is that the idea of “radical 
democracy” remains a fata morgana, because the kind of democratic decision-
8 See CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEGITIMACY IN 
HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 339 (2011).
9 For the notion of legal pluralism, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism Past to Present, 
Local to Global, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. (2007).
10 For an extensive analysis, see THORNHILL, supra note 8.
11 See GUNTHER  TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL  FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION 21-24 (2012).
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-making which has emerged in nation-states is an institutional form intrinsically 
linked to the particularities of the medium of political power12.
II – ThE MuLTIPLE LAyERS Of WORLD SOCIETy
When the diagnosis of statehood, as an expanding but nonetheless 
limited form of political ordering, is linked to the issue of globalization, it 
becomes evident that one cannot and should not see statehood and the 
existence of extensive forms of transnational social ordering as related to each 
other on the basis of a zero-sum game. On the contrary, the two dimensions 
of world society are engaged in a relationship of mutual increase. Whereas 
the globalization discourse is based on the assumption of a radical increase 
in the importance and centrality of transnational forms of social ordering13, a 
historical perspective reveals that national and transnational forms of ordering 
emerged hand in hand14. The first modern public and private international 
organizations appeared in the early nineteenth century at a time when only 
a handful of modern states, covering an extremely limited part of the global 
territory, existed. Thus, the radical expansion in the density of modern forms 
of transnational ordering over the past two hundred years unfolded hand in 
hand with the equally radical expansion in statehood. In both cases, the most 
intensive expansions further took place in the last fifty years, thereby underlining 
the mutually constitutiveness of the two forms of ordering even further. Thus, no 
inherent contradiction exists between statehood and transnational ordering. On 
the contrary, the two phenomena have emerged in a double movement, which 
implied a gradual globalization of statehood as well as a gradual replacement 
of the colonialist form of transnationality, characterized by a strong reliance 
on center/periphery differentiation, with the kind of functionally differentiated 
regimes that make up the central form of transnational ordering today15. In short, 
national and transnational forms of ordering have kept expanding their reach in 
a mutually constitutive way, at the same time as the depth of their expansion 
remains far more limited than typically assumed due to the continued existence 
and vibrancy of localistic forms of social ordering, which operate “beneath” 
state-based and transnational sites of ordering.
It follows that the system theoretical concept of world society, which 
advances the idea that only one society exists and that this society mainly 
is characterized by horizontal relations between function systems such as 
12 Poul Kjaer, Law and Order Within and Beyond National Configurations, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 395 (Poul F. Kjaer, 
Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011).
13 See Kjaer, supra note 5, at 285.
14 Id.
15 See Mathias Albert & Barry Buzan, Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation, 42 SECURITY 
DIALOGUE 413, 423 (2011).
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politics, law, religion, economy and art, is inadequate because it does not 
sufficiently acknowledge the independent value of the vertical dimension of 
structure formation in world society as reflected in the fundamentally different 
organizational principles and logics characterizing local, national, and 
transnational forms of social ordering in the global realm. A systematic two-
dimensional perspective taking both vertical and horizontal structures into 
account, however, implies that transnational and national structures cannot 
be considered functional equivalents possessing a quality that makes them 
mutually substitutable16. Rather than a globalization of already existing societal 
regimes, which so far were embedded in national contexts, transnational regimes 
constitute a different kind of regimes that fulfill quite different societal functions. 
This is also reflected in their different origins. The complex constitutional 
conglomerates, which in everyday language are described as nation-states, grew 
gradually, through a metamorphosis, out of the already existing feudal orders17. 
Present day transnational regimes, on the other hand, primarily emerged from 
within the colonial form of transnational ordering18, through the reconfiguration 
of transnational processes of structure formation, away from reliance on center/
periphery differentiation, and toward an increased reliance on functional 
differentiation as their central organizational principle.
III – ThE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LAW Of NORMATIVE ORDERS: CONDENSATION AND TRANSfER
The term “transnational” is, however, problematic because it reflects 
the state-centered bias of our conceptual apparatus. It is a purely negatively 
defined term, which merely refers to a “nonstate” structure with a spatial reach 
extending beyond state borders19. In praxis the term, therefore, implies that the 
concept of (nation) states is upheld as the central object of analysis. This has led 
proponents of transnational law to argue that society and not the state should be 
considered the central source of law creation20. Although true in principle, the 
concept of society, however, remains too broad and underdetermined to serve 
as the principle unit of analysis. Therefore, a more adequate object of analysis is 
normative orders. Normative orders – such as tribes, clans, states, organizations, 
regimes, and networks – are located within all three layers of world society 
and share an ability to generate independent sources of meaning (Sinn) through 
the reproduction of external boundaries on the basis of inclusion/exclusion 
16 Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 652-53.
17 Kjaer, supra note 5, at 285.
18 See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989) (discussing “the assumptions which control 
modern discourse about international law”).
19 See generally PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
20 Peer Zumbansen, Law and Legal Pluralism: Hybridity in Transnational Governance, in REGULATORY 
HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE (Paulius Jurčys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yurakami eds., 
2013).
32    .........................................................................................................DPU Nº 76 – Jul-Ago/2017 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 14, n. 76, 2017, 26-49, jul-ago 2017
mechanisms. Internally normative orders are furthermore characterized by a 
striving toward establishing a coherent arrangement of rules, reflecting specific 
structures of expectations (Erwartungsstrukturen)21, which are linked to the 
deployment of legal sanctions as a means of establishing compliance with these 
expectations. Or differently put, the condition for a social structure to become a 
normative order is that it gains a generalized legal form.
Rather than the far too narrow categories of national and transnational 
law (the latter sometimes described as international, global, or world law), it is 
fruitful to introduce a distinction between the internal and external dimensions 
of the law of normative orders. In the still maturing discourse on transnational, 
global, and world law, these forms of law are often considered to be functional 
equivalents to nation-state law in the sense that the two forms of law are considered 
to fulfill identical societal functions and thus to be mutually substitutable22. The 
distinction between the internal and external law of normative orders, however, 
provide a basis for a different view23. Indeed, both dimensions of law refer to 
the same internal symbol of validity (Geltungsymbol) – namely, the code law 
and nonlaw – which serves as the central propeller of reflexivity through which 
the self-preservation of law is ensured. In a similar vein, the prestation (Leistung) 
that the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders produce 
vis-à-vis other partial segments of world society remains the same insofar as both 
dimensions are oriented toward the handling of social conflicts occurring in 
other partial segments of society. The fundamental, and very decisive, difference 
between the internal and external law of normative orders can be found in 
relation to their respective functions vis-à-vis world society in its entirety. The 
primary function of the internal dimension is to ensure a positive condensation, 
accomplished through reiteration24 of the normative order in question, through 
the establishment of a general convergence of the time structures reproduced 
by that order (Gesamtgesellschaftlicher Zeitausgleich)25. Somewhat relativizing 
the Luhmannian world society thesis, this means that normative orders in their 
internal setup can be understood as societies insofar as “the most general 
21 Robert N. Ross, Ellipsis and the Structure of Expectation, in 1 SAN JOSE OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN 
LINGUISTICS (1975), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ ED136558.pdf (requiring access to www.
eric.ed.gov).
22 For a critique of this perspective, see Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 645.
23 For more on this point see: Poul F. Kjaer: Law of the Worlds – Towards an Inter-Systemic Theory, in RECHT 
ZWISCHEN DOGMATIK UND THEORIE. MARC AMSTUTZ ZUM 50. GEBURTSTAG 159 [LAW INBETWEEN 
DOGMATISM AND THEORY. FOR MARC AMSTUTZ’S 50TH BIRTHDAY] (Stefan Keller & Stefan Wipraechtiger 
eds., 2012) (Ger.); Poul F. Kjaer, The Political Foundations of Conflicts Law, 2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY 227 (2011).
24 See Poul Kjaer, Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann-Debate, Sept. 2006 ANCILLA 
IURIS 66, 70.
25 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW OF THE COMMUNITY] 427 (Suhrkamp Verlag 
1993) (Ger.).
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function of a societal community is to articulate a system of norms with a 
collective organization that has unity and cohesiveness”26.
The function of the external law of normative orders is the direct opposite. 
Instead of condensation, its function is to facilitate the transfer of compressed 
social components (Sinnkomponente), such as economic products and capital, 
scientific knowledge, religious beliefs, political decisions, and educational 
competences, between different legally condensed normative orders. As is also 
apparent in Christian Joerges’s conflict laws approach within the context of 
European Union law27, and Marc Amstutz’s world law theory, using the private 
law example of Corporate Social Responsibility28, the external law of normative 
orders is essentially oriented toward establishing compatibility between different 
legally condensed normative orders. Expressed differently, although both the 
internal and the external dimensions of the law of normative orders produce 
elements of positive and negative integration, both forms are characterized by a 
fundamental structural asymmetry insofar as the inner law of normative orders 
has a built-in bias in favor of positive integration through condensation and the 
external law a bias in favor of negative integration through the facilitation of 
transfer29.
Not surprisingly, ideologically inclined participants in the ongoing 
academic debate on the globalization of law and constitutional ordering tend 
to analyze the implications of the distinction between internal and external 
dimensions of normative orders as a difference between republican and liberal 
perspectives30. Going beyond such indulgence in semantics, which merely 
scratches on the surface of the social, the fundamentally different functions of 
the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders provide an 
explanation of the mutual constitutiveness between national and transnational 
forms of ordering in world society. Increased internal condensation of a 
normative order implies the fortification of its boundaries through the activation 
of exclusion mechanisms31. But far more decisive is that the effective maintenance 
of boundaries always implies adaptation to the environment in which such 
boundaries are made. A central insight of systems theory is, therefore, that 
increased closure of a social entity is the condition for increased openness and 
26 TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES 11 (1971).
27 See, e.g., Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli, A New Type of Conflicts Law as Constitutional form 
in the Postnational Constellation, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 153 (2011).
28 Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 657.
29 For an illustration of this in relation to “Social Europe,” see Christian Joerges, Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: 
How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration Process, 9 COMP. SOC. 65 (2010).
30 See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multi-level European Polity, in THE TWILIGHT OF CON 
STITUTIONALISM? 89 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010) (“develop[ing] a t heoretical framework 
which distinguishes between the sources for legitimation in European politics [...] and t he exercise of public 
authority.”).
31 NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIALE SYSTEME. GRUNDRIß EINER ALLGEMEINEN THEORIE [SOCIAL SYSTEMS: 
LAYOUT OF A GENERAL THEORY] 593 (Suhrkamp, 1984) (Ger.).
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vice versa32. Or differentially expressed, increased condensation is conditioned 
by increased possibility of transfer. For example, the conversion of early modern 
England and the Netherlands into the first modern states was closely linked to 
them being comparatively open economies, just as the gradual strengthening of 
these states was structurally related to their embeddedness in extensive forms 
of private law-based transnational ordering through colonialism33. In the same 
manner, the most modern states today, such as those located in North America 
and northwestern Europe, remain the states with the most open economics and 
the highest level of embeddedness in transnational frameworks, such as the 
quasi-imperial alliance system of the United States and the European Union. 
Furthermore – and rather counterintuitively – a strong correlation seems to exist 
between the (economic) openness of a state and the size of its public sector. 
The more open the economy is, the larger the public sector tends to be, because 
increased openness implies increased volatility, thereby creating a functional 
need for the introduction of stabilizing mechanisms34.
IV – ThE RECONfIGuRATION Of COGNITIVE AND NORMATIVE STRuCTuRES Of EXPECTATIONS
The fundamentally different functions of the internal and external law 
of normative orders, as expressed in their respective orientations toward 
condensation and transfer, are also reflected in the structure of expectations 
that the two forms of law rely on. As mentioned, systems theory advances the 
insight that only one society – namely, world society – exists35. Furthermore, 
the increasingly globalized structures of world society are characterized by an 
increased reliance on cognitive-based structures of expectations, understood 
as expectations subject to revision in case of disappointment, and by a 
diminished reliance on normative-based structures of expectations, understood 
as expectations upheld in spite of disappointment36. This dislocation is seen 
as linked to a relative increase in the centrality of social processes with a 
strong cognitive component, such as those related to science, technology, 
and economy, and to a concordant relative decline in the relevance of social 
processes with a strong normative component, such as those related to politics, 
morality, religion, and law in the global realm37.
32 Id.
33 See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 1 (2011) (discussing development of private rights from Spanish origins).
34 See generally Torben M. Andersen & Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson, Measuring Globalization (Institute for Study 
of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper 817, 2003) (Ger.) (using multifactor analysis to measure t he openness of a 
country).
35 Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG, BAND 2: AUFSÄTZE ZUR 
THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFT [SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 2: ESSAYS ON THEORY OF 
SOCIETY] 63 (2005) (1970) (Ger.).
36 Id. at 68.
37 Id.
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This perspective, however, falls too short and goes too far at the same time. 
It falls too short because, as also reflected in the emergence of Managerialism38 
at the transnational level, it is difficult to argue that a relative decline in the 
relevance of political and legal forms of communication can be observed. 
Rather, it is possible to observe a far more profound transformation in the very 
nature of such previously normative-based forms of communication. From the 
Open Method of Coordination, to corporate social responsibility measures 
and science-based risk regulation, it is possible to observe the emergence of 
novel forms of political and legal regulation with a strong cognitive component 
at the transnational level. This development is, of course, not limited to the 
transnational sphere, but is rather a far more profound development that also 
can be observed within the nation-state level of world society39. But due to the 
strong reliance on functional differentiation at the transnational level of world 
society, rather than the kind of territorial differentiation that remains a strong 
feature at the nation-state level, inclusion/exclusion processes unfold in a far 
more dynamic manner, which leads to systemic uncertainty concerning who is 
included and who is excluded. Thus, a structural pressure for far more flexible 
frameworks and, thereby, for a move toward an increased reliance on cognitive-
based frameworks can be observed within transnational structures.
In spite of the deep-seated transformation of the core fabric of law and 
politics through increased cognitivization, the system theoretical perspective on 
the relationship between cognitive and normative expectations is nonetheless 
problematic. That is the case because it frames the relation as a zero-sum game. 
Not only is the existence of one of the two dimensions logically conditioned 
by the existence of the other40, but the two sides of the distinction are mutually 
constitutive in the sense that they are the product of coevolutionary developments, 
where increased vibrancy of one dimension is conditioned by an increased 
vibrancy of the other dimension. Rather than a reduction in normative-based 
communication, a reconfiguration can be observed, which implies an increased 
cognitivization at the operational level – that is, at the level of tactics rather than 
strategy, at the level of method rather than theory, and at the level of policy 
rather than politics – while normative-based communication increasingly takes 
up a strategic role. For instance, the social phenomenon of morality – one of 
the prime examples of normatively based communication – has undergone a 
massive transformation in the wake of increased functional differentiation. It has 
38 Marrti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EUROPEAN J. 
OF INT’L RELATIONS 3, 395 (2009).
39 See Ino Augsberg, Observing (the) Law: The “Epistemological Turn” in Public Law and the Evolution of Global 
Administrative Law, 11 in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE (Paulius 
Jurčys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yatsunami eds., 2013).
40 See Moritz Renner, Death by Complexity – The Financial Crisis and the Crisis of Law in World Society, 
in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL 
DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, at 93, 98.
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pulled back and ceded its role as the initiator and medium of the “community 
terror of village life” (“Gemeinschaftsterror des dörflichen Zusammenlebens”)41 
and has become a far more reflexive form of communication. In its most modern 
form, morality merely fulfills an alarm function, reproduced along the boundaries 
of social systems that are activated in two instances42. The first instance is related 
to integrity preservation: When a social system sees itself as being the victim of 
asymmetries, crowding-out effects and colonizing tendencies emerging from its 
environment in the form of, for example, doping, corruption, prostitution, or 
pollution, that threaten the coherency of the system. In such cases, modern forms 
of moral communication fulfill the function of raising awareness when societal 
crisis emerge through processes of coalescence and boundary dissolution43.The 
second instance is specific for function systems and is expansionist in nature. 
Within function systems, in contrast to organization and interaction systems, 
logics of “complete inclusion” (Vollinklusion) through a coupling of all humans 
with specific social roles (producing or audience roles) that correspond to the 
system in question can be observed44. Missionary religions seek to convert all 
humans worldwide into believers, the capitalist economy seeks to transform 
all humans into producers and consumers, and the human rights agenda is 
oriented toward a formal and factual inclusion of all humans under the umbrella 
of human rights. But as long as such striving remains contrafactual, rather than 
factual, through the exclusion of a significant number of individuals, moral 
communication tends to emerge45. Moral communication in this instance fulfills 
the function of pointing to an “untapped potential,” which can be a source of 
further expansion of the system in question.
In a similar fashion, the retreat of politics from hands-on control over 
large segments of society in recent decades implies a reconfiguration of the 
political, rather than a diminished impact of political forms of communication. 
As the Foucaultians teach us, the emergence of more refined, indirect, and thus, 
in their abstraction, less visible ways of exercising power through new public 
management and through other strongly cognitivized forms of policy-making 
reinforces the scope for exercising power. It therefore remains impossible to 
claim that strongly cognitivized regulatory processes, for example, within 
areas as different as trade, health, food safety, or the Internet, are becoming 
increasingly depoliticized, since they are all bound up on the realization of 
41 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE COMMUNITY OF THE COMMUNITY] 
813 (Suhrkamp 1997) (Ger.).
42 Id.
43 See generally Marc Amstutz, Eroding Boundaries: On Financial Crisis and an Evolutionary Concept of 
Regulatory Reform, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF 
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, at 223 (discussing the dynamics in the dissolution of the 
financial system’s boundaries as well as impacts on other aspects of society).
44 RUDOLF STICHWEH, INKLUSION UND EKLUSION. STUDIEN ZUR GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE [INCLUSION 
AND EXCLUSION. STUDIES ON SOCIAL THEORY] 13 (Transcript, 2005) (Ger.).
45 Id.
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internally defined normative and essentially political visions concerning the 
establishment of nondiscriminatory free trade, access to health, appropriate 
levels of food security, and access to Internet-based communication on a 
worldwide basis.
It follows from the above that the constitutive distinction of normative 
orders is the doubling of reality (Realitätsverdopplung) between facticity and 
normativity as expressed in the distinction between the factual existing order 
and the internally reproduced, and equally real, idea concerning how the order 
in question ought to look like. As all social phenomena are process-based, this 
distinction is, however, of a dynamic nature. Normative visions also change 
over time; they only do so at a slower pace than the actually unfolding, and 
increasingly cognitivized, social operations of a given order. A time gap exists 
between the two dimensions and bridging this gap is the central function of 
law in both its internal and external variants. The upholding of normative 
expectations through condensation, dominant at the nation-state level, as well 
as the increased possibility of transfer through the initiation of cognitive-based 
learning processes, particularly observable at the transnational level of world 
society, merely remain two different strategies for fulfilling this function. As we 
will return to in due course, establishing the unity between the two dimensions 
is, furthermore, the central function of constitutionalism.
V – ThE DOuBLE REfLEXIVITy Of INTERNAL CONSTITuTIONS
Constitutions are commonly understood as frames with a quasi-
transcendental character, as also expressed in the semantics of body politics 
in early modernity46. If constitutions fulfilled the function of framing normative 
orders in their entirety, it would be possible to maintain such a perspective. That 
is, however, not the case since the constitutional object, throughout modern 
history, has been the formal organizations of normative orders rather than the 
normative orders themselves. This fundamental distinction has typically been 
disregarded within constitutional scholarship. For example, those who maintain 
that states are the only proper constitutional objects rely on an under-complex 
understanding of statehood, in which the state is equaled to a given normative 
order or society, in its entirety. As has been clear since Hegel’s introduction 
of the state/society distinction, a state is, however, a specific form of formal 
organization among others, or more correctly, a loosely coupled conglomerate 
of several organizations, which exists only as long as it is formally and 
operationally separated from the other segments of society47. The constitution of 
46 ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
(1957).
47 Niklas Luhm ann, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG, 
BAND 4: BEITRÄGE ZUR FUNKTIONALEN DIFFERENZIERUNG DER GESSELLSCHAFT [SOCIOLOGICAL 
ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 4: ESSAYS ON THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY ] 67 (1987) 
(Ger.).
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the state is, therefore, not the constitution of a normative order in its entirety, but 
of a specific organizational conglomerate.
One implication that follows from the insight that the constitutional object 
is not the state, but rather formal organizations, is that the range of constitutional 
objects is far broader than typically assumed. This is also underlined by the 
historical evolution of modern forms of formal organization, since the basic 
organizational features of states were originally developed within the framework 
of the Catholic Church and only subsequently adopted by the emerging modern 
states48. In a similar manner, modern firms and other private organizations relied 
on the modern state as the role model, from which they adopted their basic 
features49, thereby opening up a conceptual horizon that makes it possible to 
imagine quite a radical expansion in the sort of organizations which can be 
observed through a constitutional lens.
A third implication is that the culturalist version of legal pluralism misses 
a fundamental point when leaving out the organizational perspective. Whereas 
the state centrist argument, concerning constitutions being specific to modern 
states, falls too short, its insight concerning the specific modern character of 
constitutions is fundamentally true, as also expressed in the intrinsic link 
between modern formal organizations and the emergence of constitutions. 
Thus, whereas modern statehood and transnational forms of ordering are 
coevolutionary phenomena – because they rely on the same form of modern 
formal organization – they are both engaged in a zero-sum relation vis-à-vis 
the kind of “pre-modern” and “culturalist” entities, such as tribes, clans, and 
nobility networks operating “beneath” both the state and transnational orders, 
which are gradually being marginalized as a result of the conversion of society 
into a modern “organizational society” (Organisationsgesellschaft).
In the wake of Hegel50 and Weber51, a number of core features of 
organizations can be pinned out:
First: Formalized exclusion and inclusion mechanisms on the basis of 
membership enabling the establishment of boundaries between an organization 
and its environment. Such membership is further divided between primary 
(Leistungsrollen) and secondary roles (Publikumsrollen).
48 Kantorowicz, supra note 46.
49 See generally Poul F. Kjaer, Post-Hegelian Networks: Comments on the Chapter by Simon Deakin, in 
NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 75 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner 
eds., 2009) (using the metaphor of a guild to examine emerging structures in “the so-called network society”).
50 Georg W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im 
Grundrisse [Base Lines of the Philosophy of Law. Or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline], in WERKE 
IN 20 BÄNDEN MIT REGISTERBAND, BAND 7 [WORKS IN 20 VOLUMES WITH INDEX VOLUME, VOLUME 
7] § 277 (Suhrkamp, 1986) (1821) (Ger.).
51 Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills 
eds. & trans., 1991) (1946).
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Second: Formalized competences and procedures of decision-making 
enabling a continued production of decisions, which apply to all members, with 
one decision recursively emerging from earlier decisions.
Third: A reliance on dual organizational and legal hierarchies as the form 
through which decisions are taken and transposed to the members.
Fourth: The existence of a formalized locus of authority that acts as a 
vehicle for producing acceptance of the decisions produced.
To the extent that all of these features are in place, it becomes possible 
to speak of organizations as specific forms of autonomous ordering in the sense 
that they become self-contained structures producing decisions in a recursive 
manner, where one decision refers to earlier decisions through reference to an 
internal source of authority. As such, organizations first exist in a mature form 
when they become self-reflexive in the sense that the production of decisions 
becomes an internal process that unfolds over time.
A linkage to an external dimension, however, remains a condition insofar 
as it is possible to speak of organizations as formal organizations only if they 
are legally structured. Organizations only become formal organizations through 
a linkage with a legal framework because concordance with a coherent legal 
framework is the form through which the four dimensions mentioned above 
are structurally linked and coherency is established. As Teubner argued, formal 
organization implies a specific form of double reflexivity in the sense that the 
perspective of the organization in question and a legal perspective are coupled 
together52. Thus, the social process reproduced by a given organization is 
simultaneously being mirrored in a concordant legal perspective. Or differently 
expressed, organizational hierarchy is mirrored in a correspondent hierarchy of 
legal norms.
The structural condition for the emergence of double reflexivity is, 
however, as indicated under point three and four above, the internal existence 
of hierarchy and autonomous sources of authority that can serve as a basis for 
collectively binding decision-making. Thus, without the existence of a political 
infrastructure within a given social structure, there is no basis for a stable 
institutionalization of double reflexivity. The Court of Arbitration for Sport can 
only engage in a mode of double reflexivity as long as a political counterpart 
exists in the form of the International Olympic Committee. Likewise, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Panel and Appellate Bodies can only establish links 
possessing the quality of double reflexivity through a linkage to the political 
dimension of the WTO in the form of the Ministerial Conference, the General 
52 Gunt her Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of ‘Hitting the Bottom’, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, 
at 3, 25.
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Council, and so forth. This form of double reflexivity can, as done by Moritz 
Renner, be understood as a triangular structural coupling between the legal and 
political systems and given focal social process53. This perspective implies a 
welcome break with system theoretical orthodoxy, since systems theory in its 
present form can operate only with binary relations. A break with the binary 
perspective not only implies a substantially different societal diagnosis than the 
one presented by orthodox systems theory, but also implies that one has to 
pursue a radical remodulation of the theory in its entirety. An alternative to 
the triangular perspective emerges through the distinction between primary and 
secondary forms of the political system54. The distinction is between, on the one 
hand, couplings of law and processes that are primarily political, such as those 
unfolding within states and public transnational bodies such as the European 
Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization, and, on the 
other hand, couplings between the legal system and private social processes 
where political decision-making structures have emerged internally55. The latter 
form can be observed within private entities, such as trade associations, private 
regulatory bodies, and NGOs, and can be described as a form of “secondary 
politics”. Secondary politics describe such structures primarily because they 
consider themselves related to the substantial function they exercise – for 
example, economy, sports, health, or religion – at the same time as their striving 
toward a stabilization of such processes gives them an additional political 
dimension.
In sum, constitutions can be understood as institutions which, in their 
political function, frame the body of rules and norms that establish the formal 
structure, decisional competences, and a hierarchically based locus of authority 
within an organizational structure; at the same time, they, in their legal function, 
lay down principles for the structuring of conflicts between norms within such an 
entity. Constitutions are in this sense laying down the enabling and the limitative 
rules guiding formal organizations. Thus, it is, in principle, possible to claim 
that constitutions exist in all cases where both a legal and a nonlegal social 
structure are bound together within the framework of a formal organization, 
thereby establishing a particular form of double self-constitution that ensures 
concordance between a legal and nonlegal perspective. Not just states, but in 
principle all formal organizations, including those operating in the transnational 
sphere, can be the object of a constitution56.
53 See Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism in Transnational Corporate Accounting, 20 
IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
54 See TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 114.
55 For more on this point see Kjaer, supra note 12, at 395, 425.
56 See Hauke Brunkhorst, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the World Society, in THE TWILIGHT OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 6, at 179, 197.
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VI – ThE DOuBLE PRESTATION Of EXTERNAL CONSTITuTIONALIzATION
In the above section, constitutions are treated as an internal feature of 
formal organizations, in the sense that a linkage with law enables a condensation 
of authority through the establishment of legal and organizational hierarchy. But 
like all other types of social systems, organizations only come into existence 
through a demarcation and maintenance of boundaries to their respective social 
environments57. The establishment of coherency through the development of 
a consistent set of internal norms is conditioned by the maintenance of such 
boundaries. At the same time organizations, like all other types of social systems, 
intersect with other social structures in their social environment. Besides handling 
the functional need of internal preservation of coherency, as outlined in the 
previous section, the establishment of external connectability is the most central 
function of constitutions. Constitutions, in their external dimension, delineate 
the segment of their social environments that organizations, or conglomerates of 
organizations, take account of. Constitutions establish “internal environments” 
in the sense that they internally construct an abstract medium that fulfills a dual 
role: First, the transposition of compressed social components, such as political 
decisions, economic capital and products, scientific knowledge, and religious 
promises of salvation that a given organization produces into the wider society. 
Second, the channeling and incorporation of compressed social components 
produced elsewhere in society into a given organization. The praxis of fulfilling 
this dual function is what is being described with the term constitutionalization58, 
insofar as this term denotes the process of stabilizing the exchanges between a 
given formal organization and the rest of society. Thus, returning to classical 
constitutional vocabulary, constitutionalization can also be understood as the 
internal process through which a formal organization delineates a constitutional 
subject59. A subject that not only provides a mirror image of the organization’s 
social environment, but also serves as the medium for the transposition of 
compressed social components to and from the social environment of a given 
organization.
The classical example of such an internal environment is the legally 
constructed “nation” or “people” emerging within the political system in the state 
form. The construction of a nation – understood as an abstract and generalized 
form, as opposed to the sum of individuals within a given territory – is made 
to delineate the segment of its social environment of which a given political 
system observes and takes account in its decision-making. For example, the 
57 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE COMMUNITY OF THE COMMUNITY] 
826 (Suhrkamp 1997) (Ger.).
58 See Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalisation?, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra 
note 6, at 47, 60.
59 For this perspective, see also Christopher Thornhill, A Sociology of Constituent Power: The Political Code of 
Transnational Societal Constitutions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2013).
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United States Congress is only obliged to account of the effects that its decision-
making has on the American nation, but not the effects on the Canadian or the 
Mexican nations. More concretely, the concept of the nation serves as a medium 
through which decisions are transposed into the wider society. On the other 
hand, the nation is also a form through which perspectives emerging from the 
environment are transferred into the political system. In order for this to happen, 
an operationalization of the nation, through the construction of social roles and 
specific structures of expectation, is necessary. This takes two different forms: 
First, an operationalization occurs through a stabilization and formalization 
of relations to other organizational structures since relations are formalized 
through institutionalized negotiation systems (Verhandlungssysteme) in the form 
of advisory councils, networks, commissions, and other platforms of transfer 
that are established between the political system and various organizations (e.g. 
economic, scientific, and religious organizations). Second, operationalization 
occurs through the establishment of primary and secondary roles by introducing 
a distinction between those who govern and those who are being governed 
(Regierende und Regierte)60 – that is, those who are internally located in the 
political system and those who are located in the internal environment. In 
democratic states, a further distinction between the citizens and the voter is 
further introduced within the environment. The former is serving a passive role 
as “audience” and the latter an active role in the sense that, through voting, the 
actual transfer from the environment to the political system takes place.
At the transnational level of world society, the turn to network-based 
governance fulfills a similar role for organizations operating within functionally 
delineated normative orders. In the case of the EU, governance structures 
such as Comitology and the Open Method of Coordination and (Regulatory) 
Agencies fulfill the role as heterarchcial frameworks through which transfer of 
compressed social components between the EU legal order and its environment 
(including the legal orders of the Member States) are framed61. Comparable, 
though far more embryonic, structures have also emerged around global public 
and private organizations such as large-scale NGOs, multinational companies, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). These organizations share the feature that they are faced 
with the challenge of delineating their respective environments but cannot 
turn to the concept of a nation, as they are not internally stabilized through 
a reference to territorial demarcations, thereby triggering the emergence of 
the concept of “stakeholders” as a functional equivalent to the concept of 
60 Niklas Luhm ann, Die Zukunft der Demokratie, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG, BAND 4: BEITRÄGE ZUR 
FUNKTIONALEN DIFFERENZIERUNG DER GESSELLSCHAFT [SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 
4: ESSAYS ON THE FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOICETY ] supra note 47, at 126.
61 POUL F. KJAER, BETWEEN GOVERNING AND GOVERNANCE: ON THE EMERGENCE, FUNCTION AND 
FORM OF EUROPE’S POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION 37 (2010).
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the nation. The stakeholder form is characterized by a far stronger cognitive 
component when compared with the form of the nation, insofar as it possesses 
a strong element of exchangeability on the basis of a criterion of functionality62. 
Although nations rarely have been the stable units that nationalist theory and 
most normative political and legal theories assume them to be, the logics of 
inclusion and exclusion nevertheless have a far stronger temporal character 
within stakeholder settings63.
The increased level of temporality, and thus contingency, is the likely 
explanation of the strong reliance on rights within transnational settings. Rights 
are the legal form which constitutionalization takes. Whereas Thornhill seems 
to reduce rights to the only form through which inclusion/exclusion processes 
are handled64, the structural capability of both national and transnational 
formal organizations to develop rights regimes seems to be conditioned by their 
attachment to generalized nonlegal mediums that represent a distilled version 
of existing sociocultural material, as expressed in the nation and stakeholder 
phenomena. Even though rights regimes tend to emerge from within the social 
processes they are attached to – rather than being externally imposed – they 
become identifiable and operational only when a distinction between the legal 
and the nonlegal dimensions is established, leading to the emergence of a specific 
form of double prestation. Traditionally, the register of rights is understood as 
the framework through which, in the same operation, liberties are secured 
and obligations imposed on legal subjects65. The central societal prestation 
(Leistung) of rights is, however, to provide compressed social components with 
a legal form, which enable their transfer in a manner that does not destabilize 
the operational integrity of the donating as well as the receiving entity66.
It follows that constitutionalization does not only imply an increase in the 
self-reflexivity of a given formal organization. Constitutionalization is not just an 
exercise in negative self-binding that organizations pursue to reduce the risk of 
self-destruction through systemic overstretch67. This view, which can be traced 
back to Luhmann’s strategic, but essentially contingent, choice to emphasize the 
self-reflexivity of social systems while systematically playing down the prestation 
and function dimensions of social systems, leads to an empirically implausible 
description of society68. Rather, constitutionalization processes provide a far 
62 See Poul F. Kjaer, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental European Perspective on 
Governance, Law and the Political in the Transnational Space, 57 WIS. L. REV. 489 (2010).
63 Id.
64 Thornhill, supra note 59.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Teubner, supra note 52, at 21.
68 Luhmann maintains formal equality between the three dimensions at the same time as his empirical 
descriptions of social processes tend to have a one-sided focus on the reflexivity dimension. For the formal 
layout, see LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 610.
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more positive contribution toward other segments of society insofar as they are 
aimed at reducing negative externalities, colonizing tendencies, and crowding 
out effects vis-à-vis the respective environments of constitutional orders. This is 
also confirmed by the contextual settings within which constitutions emerge. 
Constitutions never stand alone, but always emerge in coevolutionary settings 
where several orders emerge simultaneously. Nation-states, for example, are 
not unitary structures but rather take the form of constitutional conglomerates 
where state constitutions, church constitutions, and labor constitutions come 
together. This again makes the multiple intersections between constitutions 
into battlefields where constitutional orders are delineated and where justifying 
narratives emerge concerning the prestation that specific constitutional orders 
produce vis-à-vis other segments of society. The emergence of constitutions 
is structurally conditioned by constitutionalization processes capable of 
guaranteeing that mutually reinforcing coevolutionary processes unfold. The 
emergence of an autonomous constitutional order within the European Union 
is a perfect example of this, insofar as the internal establishment of legal and 
organizational hierarchy was conditioned on the coevolutionary emergence 
of heterarchical legal and organizational frameworks, in the form of the 
governance structures, such as Agencies, Comitology, and the Open Method of 
Coordination, which ensured concordance between the EU constitutional order 
and its environment, most notably the Member State legal orders.
VII – ThE DOuBLE fuNCTION Of CONSTITuTIONALISM BETWEEN PAST AND fuTuRE
The distinction between internal ordering and external heterarchy, as 
expressed in the distinction between constitutions and constitutionalization, 
constitutes a paradoxical tension. This tension can also be described utilizing 
the distinction between hierarchically organized and spontaneous heterarchical 
processes69. A normative order first exists when a unity of these two dimensions 
is established, and establishing this unity necessitates recourse in time. In the 
same manner, as normative constitutional theory seeks to dissolve the tension 
between republican politics and liberal rights through societal learning processes 
unfolded over time70, it is also possible to observe from a sociological perspective 
that constitutional setups do not just mirror existing structures, but rather, 
express a specific vision of the future on the basis of a specific understanding 
of the past71. Such visions can also be described as representing a form of 
“constitutional consciousness” capable of providing a basis for a counterfactual 
claim concerning a possible constitutional framing of a normative order in 
69 See TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 89-90.
70 See Jürgen Habermas & William Rehg, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 774 (William Rehg trans., 2001).
71 Id.
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its entirety. It is the establishment of such constitutional consciousness that is 
described with the term constitutionalism.
As indicated earlier, law operates with counterfactual propositions, 
which are oriented toward the future. Constitutionalism, however, implies 
orientation toward a specific kind of counterfactual proposition that can be 
described with the term double function. Constitutionalism implies that from 
a focal perspective – including economic, political, or environmental – as well 
as from a legal perspective, a vision of “complete inclusion” is developed, 
which implies that, in principle, all humans can be subject to inclusion into the 
normative order in question. Originally developed within the Church of Rome, 
the counterfactual striving for complete inclusion – in this case through the 
transformation of all individuals into members of the Catholic Church and the 
subordination of all worldly powers into subordinates of Rome – has become 
generalized. For example, the French Republic, the historical role model for 
most continental states, has traditionally relied on a self-understanding that is 
closely linked to the counterfactual idea concerning a realization of the ideals 
of the French revolution throughout the world. Similar developments can be 
observed within sectorial regimes consisting of constitutional organizations 
and their surrounding constitutionalized networks, such as the WTO regime, 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) regime, 
the WHO regime, and the still emerging global human rights regime72. 
Counterfactual objectives are universal in nature, such as the striving toward 
the realization of nondiscriminatory free trade, free and uncensored global 
access to the Internet, basic worldwide access to health, and not only a formal, 
but also a de facto inclusion of all humans under the umbrella of the human 
rights regime. In other words, constitutionalism implies the institutionalization 
of normative teleology’s and a hierarchical relationship between teleology’s and 
increasingly cognitivized processes of juridification. Once such logics are in 
place, it is possible to talk about constitutionalism in a deep and mature sense. 
Constitutional ordering is, therefore, not only about facilitative and limitative 
rules, but also reflects a move toward self-transcendence through the unfolding 
of a universalistic aspiration.
VIII – ThE EXAMPLE Of ThE fAIRTRADE CERTIfICATION SySTEM
From the theoretical framework outlined above, three core dimensions of 
a mature constitutionalist order can be deduced:
A constitutional order characterized by double reflexivity through 
a coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical 
72 Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. OF INT’L. L. 999 (2004).
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organization that can produce an autonomous source of authority, and a 
concordant legal framework.
Constitutionalization through double prestation, implying a coupling 
between, on the one hand, an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional 
subject within the constitutional object, and, on the other hand, a register of 
legal rights, establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional 
object and the wider world, as represented by the constitutional subject.
Constitutionalism, through the institutionalization of a double function, 
in the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving toward universal 
inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time through an articulated form of 
constitutional consciousness.
The real world existence of such frameworks can be briefly illustrated 
through the example of the Fairtrade Certification System. The scheme is 
organized and overseen by a private international organization, the Fairtrade 
Labeling Organizations International (FLO)73. FLO was founded in 1997 as an 
international umbrella organization for national fair trade labeling organizations. 
Its core task is to develop internationally coordinated standards for fair trade and 
to assist producers in gaining and maintaining certification of fair trade. The 
central focus is on agricultural products, such as bananas and coffee, but FLO’s 
reach has also been expanded into areas such as textiles. The products are, 
however, part of global production, distribution, and consumption chains that 
typically imply transfers between developing and developed parts of the global 
economy74.
The orientation is twofold, as the standards are aimed at ensuring 
ecological sustainability and establishing social and labor standards in the 
production process. A key strategy of FLO is to establish transparent and long-
term trade relations among producers, importers, processers, and distributors 
through long-term contracts that set minimum prices, thereby reducing the 
exposure of the producers to market volatility and pressure from large-scale 
companies75. In addition, a “social premium” is paid, serving as a kind of de 
facto tax that is allocated to the promotion of common goods relevant to the 
producers and is typically invested in local development, such as education 
73 See What We Do, FAIRTRADE INT’L, http://www.fairtrade.net/what_we_do.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
74 For an overview of the framework see especially ALEX NICHOLLS & CHARLOTTE OPAL, FAIR TRADE: 
MARKET-DRIVEN ETHICAL CONSUMPTION (2005). See also DANIEL JAFFEE, BREWING JUSTICE: FAIR 
TRADE COFFEE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND SURVIVAL (2007) (examining if fair trade is working by looking at 
coffee farmers in Mexico); Valentin Beck, Theorizing Fairtrade From a Justice-Related Standpoint, 3 GLOBAL 
JUSTICE: THEORY, PRACTICE, RHETORIC 1 (2010) (examining fair trade in two step process, first looking at 
interactions of participants and then looking at responsibilities of participants); Loraine Ronchi, The Impact of 
Fair Trade on Producers and Their Organisations: A Case Study with Coocafé in Costa Rica (Poverty Research 
Unit at Sussex, Prus Working Paper No. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/PRU/wps/
wp11.pdf.
75 What we do, supra note 73.
DPU Nº 76 – Jul-Ago/2017 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA .............................................................................................................47 
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 14, n. 76, 2017, 26-49, jul-ago 2017
and health facilities for the producers. The producers who own the production 
sites – typically agricultural land – are organized in cooperatives. Alternatively, 
work councils are established that represent employees vis-à-vis landowners76.
In 2004, the organization was split into two subunits: FLO International 
and FLO-CERT. Both are based in Bonn, Germany. FLO is a not-for-profit 
organization (“eingetragener Verein”) and operates in concordance with 
the German public benefit law. FLO-CERT is structured as a limited-liability 
company (Gmbh) under German law77. FLO International maintained the core 
task of developing fair trade standards while FLO-CERT ensures that producers 
and traders comply with the standards of FLO International78. FLO-CERT has 
the competence to impose sanctions in case of noncompliance. The ultimate 
sanction is decertification and exclusion from the system.
FLO has developed a foundational text that it calls a constitution79. The 
constitutional text is an eleven-page document with a preamble and eighteen 
paragraphs that set out the basic framework on which the organization operates, 
including a specification of its central organs and the purpose of its activities. 
The constitutions can be amended only through a majority of 75 percent 
of the organization’s members80. The constitution establishes the General 
Assembly as the central institutional organ81. It is comprised of 50 percent 
producer representatives and 50 percent representatives from the national 
labeling organizations82. The two groups are further organized in two different 
subassemblies. The General Assembly has the characteristics of a “parliament” 
insofar as its core function is representation, the development of legislative-like 
rules, and general oversight83. As such, the assembly serves as the ultimate locus 
of authority for the organization while remaining coupled to law through the 
constitution, the internal procedural framework, and through the reliance on 
German law.
The General Assembly elects the board that consists of five representatives 
from labeling organizations; four representatives from producer organizations 
(representing different geographical regions); two representatives from 
certified traders; and three external independent experts84. Both in relation to 
76 Id.
77 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Constitution of the Association, §§ 1.1-1.2 (amended June 
10, 2011), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/about_us/documents/
flo-constitution-june-2011-english.pdf.
78 Certifying Fairtrade, FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.fairtrade.net/certifying_fairtrade.html?&L=0 
(last visited June 12, 2013).
79 Id.
80 Id. at § 3.1.
81 Id. at § 7.
82 Id. at § 9, 10.
83 Id. at § 7.1.
84 Id. at § 12.
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the assembly and the board, a key characteristic is the deliberate design of a 
multiple-stakeholder framework. The organization is, in this sense, mimicking a 
balance-of-interest approach as known from classical state-based constitutional 
set-ups. At the same time, the “external experts” are granted a privileged position 
as they hold the key to establishing a majority. The mediation between different 
stakeholder groups is assigned to representatives who are expected to represent 
a neutral and knowledge-based, and thus “cognitivized”, position. A similar 
framework exists in relation to the various subcommittees, most notably the 
standard setting committee.
The multiple-stakeholder framework also serves as an internal mirror 
reflecting the organization’s external environment. By defining specific categories 
of producers, importers, processers, and distributors in its constitution85, FLO 
delineates the segment of world society that can be potentially included in 
the framework, and thereby the boundaries of the normative order it seeks 
to establish. This delineation is then combined with specific procedures for 
actual inclusion through membership application and certification, thereby 
creating a dual framework based on a distinction between potentiality and 
actuality. Actual inclusion is, furthermore, linked to a dense framework of 
rights, imposing a dual framework of obligations and standing, most notably 
through adherence to standards and through access to review and decision-
making processes. At the same time, the rights framework serves as the central 
infrastructure, which enables the production of a specific prestation vis-à-vis 
other segments of world society, insofar as it is oriented toward the facilitation 
of transfer of products and capital between the producers, importers, processers, 
and distributors. Thus, a move toward constitutionalization can be observed as 
FLO defines a constitutional subject via its multiple-stakeholder framework and 
subsequently seeks to minimize the distinction between potential and actual 
inclusion. The implementation of the rights dimension is outsourced to FLO-
CERT, which certifies compliance through inspections and imposes sanctions 
in case of noncompliance, such as demands for corrective measures and, 
ultimately, expulsion. Thus, FLO-CERT serves as an independent “judiciary” 
that combines an investigative function with the objective of applying the norms 
produced by FLO.
Finally, FLO has condensed its activities in a mission – namely, “to connect 
disadvantaged producers and consumers, promote fairer trading conditions and 
empower producers to combat poverty, strengthen their position and take more 
control over their lives”86. This mission is deduced from a vision. The vision 
of FLO “is a world in which all producers can enjoy secure and sustainable 
85 Id.
86 Our Vision, FAIRTRADE INT’L, http://www.fairtrade.net/our_vision.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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livelihoods, fulfill their potential and decide on their future87. The organization 
remains strategically guided by a normative, and thus counterfactual, objective 
concerning full inclusion for the segment of world society, which it orients 
itself against, thereby externalizing the tension between potential and actual 
members in the future. Thus, FLO can be understood as a fully-fledged normative 
order, which internally produces coherency between its different dimensions, 
as represented by producers, importers, processers, and distributors. And so, 
FLO externally demarcates itself through the double delineation of potential 
and actual members, as well as through the establishment of a constitutional 
structure characterized by a dual political and legal hierarchy and a normative 
vision that grants it an articulated form of constitutional consciousness that 
points to the future.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
